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Other Disciplines, Methodologies, and
Countries: Studying Courts and Crisis
Tracey E. George
"We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."
-Justice O'Connor, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004)
The United States is at war: in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and against terror-
ism. This symposium asks the timely question: How do governments and
their citizens respond to fear and risk in times of crisis? Dr. Lee Epstein I and
Professor Christina Wells, 2 in papers presented on the final symposium panel,
focus in particular on the Supreme Court's response to government en-
croachment on individual liberties during a national emergency. Their work is
made particularly timely by three Supreme Court decisions this past term. In
this essay, I begin by framing the issue very briefly. I then argue that under-
standing this issue requires scholars to follow Epstein and Wells by looking
to other disciplines, methodologies, and countries.
I. THE ISSUE: JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING DURING TIMES OF WAR
One month before the present symposium, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.3 The Supreme Court also accepted two other suits 4
raising questions considered by Epstein and Wells: How will the Supreme
Court respond to threats to individual freedoms during national emergencies,
and how should it? The conventional answer to the positive question, as ex-
plained by Epstein and Wells, is that the United States has two constitu-
tions-one during times of peace and one during war.5 The answer to the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Professors
Christina Wells and Jennifer Robbennolt and their colleagues at the University of
Missouri for inviting me to participate in the present symposium. I also wish to ex-
press my gratitude to Northwestern University, where I was a professor of law at the
time of this conference, for its support of my research including this commentary.
1. Lee Epstein et al., The Effect of War on the Supreme Court, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2004).
2. Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. REV. 903 (2004).
3. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
4. Rumsfield v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004).
5. See, e.g., CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN
CHIEF 129 (1951) (observing, based on his review of wartime judicial review, that
"[t]here do indeed seem to be two Constitutions--one for peace, the other for war");
see also CLINTON ROssITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948) (examining war-
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normative question depends on the writer's conception of the costs and bene-
fits of the two standards.
6
Proponents of the two-constitutions or "crisis" thesis regularly point to
the contrasting outcomes in the Civil War decision of Ex Parte Milligan7 and
the World War II case of Korematsu v. United States.8 In Ex parte Milligan,
the Supreme Court ruled that an Indiana citizen accused of conspiring against
the Union had a right to a trial before an Article III judge rather than a mili-
tary tribunal.9 Chief Justice Davis, writing for the unanimous Milligan Court
in 1866, declared "[t]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its pro-
tection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."'10
Three-quarters of a century later, a deeply divided Korematsu Court up-
held the government's military internment, without charge or due process, of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry as well as individuals labeled "enemy
alien[s]." 11 Justice Black rationalized the majority's decision by explaining
that such "hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hard-
ships."'
' 2
The contrasting outcomes in these cases are typically attributed to the
contemporary state of crisis: The Milligan Court acted after the end of Civil
War hostilities while the Korematsu Justices issued their decision during
World War II, indeed only two days after the commencement of what became
known as the Battle of the Bulge. These two cases, then, are illustrative of the
crisis theory, namely that a "pattern of [Supreme Court] deference exists"
during national emergencies, allowing the executive to curtail rights and lib-
erties.
3
The Supreme Court recently presented a test of that theory in three cases
arising during and out of the wars in Aghanistan and Iraq. 14 In all three law-
suits, the Bush Administration argued that the terror threat justified its deci-
sion to hold suspects without charges, access to counsel, the right to challenge
time governments in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States and specifically
focusing on how each government's response to crisis affected the rights of the citi-
zens vis-A-vis the state).
6. See Wells, supra note 2, at 906-07 (reviewing the arguments of opponents
and proponents of judicial deference).
7. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
8. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
9. Milligan, 71 U.S. 2.
10. Id. at 120-21.
11. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
12. Id. at 219, For a detailed behind-the-scenes account of the Korematsu litiga-
tion, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR chs. 10-12 (1983).
13. Wells, supra note 2, at 903-07.
14. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
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their status, or any other judicial process. In one case, Rasul v. Bush,15 al
Qaeda and Taliban suspects being held indefinitely at the U.S. Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sought the right to challenge their confinement
through a habeas corpus suit in federal court.' 6 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 17 and a
third case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,1s American citizens being held as "enemy
combatants" in military prisons on U.S. soil also sought a hearing before a
civilian court regarding their status.' 9 The fundamental question before the
Court was whether federal courts have jurisdiction to protect the liberty of the
detainees given the President's assertion of national security concerns.
The two-constitutions thesis would predict that the Supreme Court
would defer to the executive in all three cases because the country is engaged
in combat in two countries and is also threatened by terror attacks within our
borders. The Supreme Court, however, did not bow to presidential power.
But, it also did not act decisively to check the President. Although the Court
rejected the President's argument that American courts lack jurisdiction over
prisoners in Guantanamo,20 the Rasul majority did allow for more limited
process than would otherwise be required under the Constitution. Similarly,
in Hamdi, the Court concluded that an American captured in Afghanistan has
the right to challenge the government's "enemy combatant" classification, but
the majority did not grant full due process rights to the prisoner.22 And, in the
case of an American citizen arrested in an American airport, a six-Justice
majority concluded that Padilla filed his suit in the wrong district and dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction.23
Not only were the holdings in the three cases confusing, the dynamics
were as well. Eleven opinions were issued in the three cases. A different Jus-
tice wrote the majority opinion in each case. In Hamdi, the Court issued a
plurality rather than a majority opinion. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were
15. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
16. Id.
17. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
18. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
19. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715 (Padilla is an American citizen who was arrested
in May 2002 at Chicago O'Hare Airport on suspicion of terrorist involvement and
was eventually transferred to a South Carolina Naval brig where he was denied access
to counsel or a right to respond to the charges.); Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635-36 (Hamdi
is an American citizen who was seized in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and was
being held at a U.S. military prison in Virginia incommunicado.).
20. See, e.g., Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686.
21. Joan Biskupic & Toni Locy, Detainees Still Will Face Many Hurdles to
Freedom, USA TODAY, June 29, 2004, at A 10 (observing that although "the Supreme
Court sharply rebuked President Bush's claim that he has unfettered power to lock up
people without giving them hearings .... the court made clear that even when a de-
tainee gets his day in court, he faces many hurdles to freedom").
22. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-49.
23. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2727. This case is eerily similar to a dispute decided
contemporaneously with Korematsu.
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in the winning coalition on every case. And, Justices Scalia and Stevens, who
disagreed in Padilla and Rasul (and more than half of the Court's other deci-
sions during the 2003-2004 term), joined together in a strongly worded dis-
sent in Hamdi.24 The lower courts were similarly confused in these cases. The
Fourth Circuit and Second Circuit split on the question presented by the
American citizen lawsuits, but both were reversed by the Supreme Court.
25
Of particular interest, the Supreme Court disagreed with the substantive hold-
ing of the Fourth Circuit, a circuit that is ideologically aligned with the Su-
preme Court.
How can we make sense of these recent Supreme Court decisions as
well as the broader subject of the Supreme Court during times of crisis? I
argue in the next Section that we must draw on social science scholarship,
richer methodologies, and comparative knowledge.
II. THE MEANS OF ANALYSIS:
INTERDISCIPLINARY, MULTI-METHOD, COMPARATIVE
The complexity of the conference's question demands an ambitious
scholarly agenda, one that looks to other disciplines, other methods, and other
countries. I consider here the value of interdisciplinary work, the gains avail-
able from exploring alternative methodologies, and the insights gleaned from
experiences in other countries.
A. Value of Interdisciplinary Work
Law should be a pluralistic discipline, drawing on paradigms created in
other fields and developing them to fit the legal context. We must look to
many disciplines beyond law in order to understand law. Now, this statement
is relatively self-serving given my own focus on theories from political sci-
ence. But, I am certainly following an accelerating trend in law. While eco-
nomics made early headway, other disciplines are gaining ground: cognitive
and social psychology, 26 sociology, political science, 27 and the list goes on.
24. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660 (Scalia, J., & Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004).
26. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Insights from Cognitive Psychology, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 42 (2004) (discussing insights from cognitive and social psychology that are
relevant and have been explored, to varying degrees, in legal scholarship); Russell
Korobkin, A Multi-disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behav-
ioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 (2001) (exam-
ining the role for these three disciplines in the study of law and arguing for an ap-
proach that draws on all three); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychol-
ogy: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739,
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The argument for an interdisciplinary perspective is especially strong for
the question of personal liberties in times of crisis. This conference, then, is
interdisciplinary both by design and by necessity. As Professor Wells high-
lights so nicely, we cannot prescribe the appropriate place for individual
rights during national emergencies without understanding the way govern-
ments and individuals act in such times. 28 In her paper, for example, she
deftly draws out the implications of the psychological study of risk assess-
ment for the judicial deference debate.29 She examines what we know about
the relative ability of decision makers to evaluate threats to national security
and to weigh those threats against the costs of limiting individual liberties.
30
She concludes that, contrary to a commonly held belief, executive officials
are prone to skewed risk assessment in the absence of objective monitoring. 31
Therefore, "rigorous judicial review can deter skewed risk assessment." 32
B. Methodological Challenge to the Legal Academy
The case study is the dominant mode of analysis in legal scholarship be-
cause it is the standard mode of education and practice in law. Case study
methodology can provide a useful and interesting description of a single court
case, but it does not and cannot explain action independent of that event.
Close study of a case reveals possible points of interest, possible relevant
factors; therefore, it is best viewed as a revelatory approach which poses
questions but provides no broader answers.33 In isolation, the case study can-
not provide us with an understanding of broader human behavior, whether
that behavior is of judges, litigants, or governments. As the crisis theory work
of Lee Epstein and her co-authors reveals, a more rigorous approach is neces-
sary to understand complex phenomena like courts and crisis.
3 4
763-66 (2000) (presenting an argument for the relevance of behavioral decision the-
ory to the study of law and legal institutions).
27. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251 (1997) (re-
viewing and comparing legal and political science study of courts); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 569 (2003) (offering a largely political-science based analysis of the
Rehnquist Court).
28. Wells, supra note 2.
29. Id. at 921-28.
30. Id. at 928-35.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 936.
33. For an excellent discussion of the relative shortcomings of the case study
methodology in the context of courts, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 44-48 (2002).
34. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra, note 1.
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Models offer this possibility. A model is a systematic, empirically veri-
fiable understanding of why a phenomenon occurs as it does. Models simplify
the world in order to focus on those factors that are crucial to an event and to
reveal the relative importance of those factors. As political economist An-
thony Downs explained, the goal of scientific theory is to explain complex
and seemingly unrelated phenomena by simple-and therefore from a realis-
tic standpoint necessarily incomplete-principles. 35 Although definitionally
incomplete, models can contribute more to our understanding of human be-
havior than hundreds of separate case studies.
One of the most valuable contributions of a model is that it is falsifi-
able.36 "That is, the model must be able to state a priori the potential condi-
tions that, if observed, would refute the model. 37 And a good model is not
merely falsifiable, but readily so, such that the model is sufficiently narrow
that it limits the field of potential behavior that satisfies its predictions. 38 Only
then does the model offer meaningful insight. If very few conditions exist that
can prove the model wrong, then the model does not tell us very much.
One of the most encouraging trends in work by law professors is the in-
creased use of a model-based approach to considering the behavior of actors
in the legal system and the development of law. Unlike a historical or case
study approach, this scholarship offers us the means to understand more fun-
damental questions with respect to a wider range of legal or law-related
events.
The use of models and data in legal scholarship poses many challenges.
Social scientists who study law and legal institutions have a comparative ad-
vantage over law professors because of their training and a shared methodol-
ogy or approach to research. Although great at research design, social scien-
tists may be comparatively weak on theory building. That is where I think law
professors hold a comparative advantage. Legal education, training, and
teaching are case-study-based so law professors think more easily about ques-
tions in a coherent explanatory fashion. But, law professors' weakness is lim-
ited methodological sophistication. There are several possible ways for legal
scholars to overcome these methodological challenges:
39
35. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 34 (1957) (ex-
plaining that his model, like all models, "is not an attempt to describe reality accu-
rately. Like all theoretical constructs in the social sciences, it treats a few variables as
crucial and ignores others which actually have some influence.").
36. See generally KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (1962).
37. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 33, at 46; see also id. at 47-48 (explaining the
concept of falsifiability).
38. Id.
39. For a much more developed and insightful set of suggestions, see Lee Ep-
stein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 114-33 (2002) (pre-
senting ways to develop an "infrastructure to support empirical research" in law).
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* Increased use of peer review and collaboration as a means of attaining
more consistently excellent work,
* Education and training in theory and methods of other disciplines as a
way to gain skills,
• Participation in other disciplines' meetings so as to develop a network
of people who will provide advice and read work, and
* An organization of law professors with empirical interests who meet to
improve our understanding.
This last idea is based on my experience as a participant in the Annual
Conference on the Scientific Study of Judicial Politics co-sponsored by NSF
and a number of universities. A recent year's theme was institutionalism.
Seven of the forty participants were law professors. One of the organizers of
the conference was Lee Epstein, who has called for increased connections
between political scientists and members of the legal academy. Perhaps it
would be possible to copy this model in order to enrich the empirical work of
law professors by providing us with a forum and a robust environment in
which to learn and teach methods.
C. Courts in Comparative Perspective
In the United States, separation of powers and the electoral scheme cre-
ate a great deal of residual power for the Supreme Court: it has room to move
between Congress and the President. In the United Kingdom, by comparison,
the executive and legislative branches are essentially monolithic. However,
the elected branches in the United States act in unison during times of crisis.
40
This surprising result offers an opportunity. We may understand more about
the crisis thesis if we consider whether the same dynamic plays out in other
constitutional democracies.
I am usually deaf to the call for cross-national comparison because of a
real skepticism about our ability to compare highly distinctive phenomena
and unique institutions across countries. 4 1 Nevertheless, the subject of this
conference may be the exact circumstance in which comparison would be
particularly effective. For example, do other developed democracies' consti-
tutional courts defer to elected branches in times of crisis? If not, is it because
their discretion remains essentially unchanged during crisis? By considering
how constitutional courts with similar and dissimilar characteristics respond
40. As Professor Geoffrey Stone noted in his presentation, the alignment may not
be as perfect as imagined as we can see by looking at legislative changes to Wilson's
Espionage Act. See Geoffrey R. Stone, War Fever, 69 MO. L. REv. 1131 (2004). See
also Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 215 (2003).
41. For an article by a conference participant making a compelling case for com-
parative study of law and courts, see Lee Epstein, The Comparative Advantage, LAW
& CTS. (Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, Washington, D.C.), Winter 1999, at 1.
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to comparable factors, we can gain a greater understanding about the United
States Supreme Court.42
A comparative perspective is a particular advantage in studies of crisis
because it offers a significant expansion in the number of observations to
study and in the types of approaches taken to crisis. 43 Comparative scholars
must recognize, however, the myriad variations across countries. Two paths
may lead courts to decisions that superficially resemble each other but are the
product of different relevant factors.
CONCLUSION
This symposium highlights the tools available, and required for, think-
ing about law and legal institutions: other fields, other methods, and other
countries. Law as an academic discipline has arguably evolved the most of
any discipline over the last hundred years. In order to continue to progress,
we will have to draw on ideas developed in non-law disciplines, to utilize
methodologies created outside of law schools, and to consider the relationship
between law in the United States and law in the world.
42. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 144-88 (1999).
43. Cf WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES ix (1977) (arguing that a "[com-
parative] perspective . . . offers far greater understanding both of certain political
problems and of judicial involvement in formulating public policy than does the tradi-
tional, ethnocentric approach to judge-made constitutional law as a peculiarly Ameri-
can phenomenon").
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